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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Robert Joseph Frauenberger appeals from the district court's judgment of 
conviction. A jury convicted Mr. Frauenberger of three counts of lewd conduct and one 
count of delivery of marijuana to a person under the age of eighteen. The Third 
Amended Criminal Information listed Bonnie Noe as the alleged minor victim involved in 
each count. However, no evidence at trial was presented concerning the alleged victim, 
thirteen year-old "Bonnie Noe." On appeal, Mr. Frauenberger asserts that the evidence 
presented at trial was insufficient to support the convictions because the State failed to 
provide substantial competent evidence to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
Mr. Frauenberger engaged in inappropriate sexual contact with "Bonnie Noe" or 
provided her with marijuana. 
Alternatively, Mr. Frauenberger asserts that the district court did not have 
jurisdiction to allow the jury to make findings on crimes related to B.H. as he had never 
been charges with said crimes. At trial, evidence was presented which showed that 
Mr. Frauenberger may have committed crimes, similar to those charged, involving 
another minor, B.H. Although the information charged Mr. Frauenberger with 
committing these crimes against "Bonnie Noe," the jury was instructed that it must find 
Mr. Frauenberger guilty if they believed he committed these crimes against B.H. 
Because Mr. Frauenberger had never been charged with committing lewd conduct 
against B.H. or providing marijuana to B.H., he asserts that the district court did not 
have jurisdiction to allow the jury to make a finding on Mr. Frauenberger's guilt as to 
those charges which had never been filed. 
1 
Alternatively, Mr. Frauenberger asserts that the district court created an 
impermissible variance when it failed to limit the elements instruction for each of the 
charges to those overt acts alleged in the Information, specifically that the alleged victim 
was Bonnie Noe, not B.H. as the jury was instructed. 
Additionally, Mr. Frauenberger asserts that the State committed prosecutorial 
misconduct which deprived him of a fair trial. The prosecution violated its duty to see 
that Mr. Frauenberger had a fair trial by engaging in vouching, presenting improper 
evidence, and appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jury. Mr. Frauenberger 
contends that the misconduct committed in his case was either preserved by objection 
or constituted fundamental error and that the errors are not harmless. Moreover, 
Mr. Frauenberger asserts the district court abused its discretion in failing to grant his 
motion for a mistrial based upon prosecutorial misconduct. 
Further, Mr. Frauenberger contends the district court abused its discretion when 
it sentenced him to an excessive sentence without considering the mitigating factors 
that exist in his case. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On December 14, 2010, a Criminal Information was filed charging 
Mr. Frauenberger with three counts lewd conduct with a child under the age of sixteen 
and two counts of delivery of marijuana to a person under the age of eighteen. 
(R., pp.18-21.) The charges specifically listed that the illegal contact had occurred with 
thirteen year-old Bonnie Noe. (R., pp.18-21.) The Information was amended several 
times, but the actual crimes charged and victim listed did not change. (R., pp.37-40, 46-
49, 75-77.) Mr. Frauenberger entered a not guilty plea to each of the charges. 
(R., p.22.) 
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At the initial trial, after selecting a jury, the district court declared a mistrial 
because each side had not been afforded the proper number of preemptory challenges. 
(R., pp.51-52.) The trial was rescheduled. (R., pp.51-52.) On April 26, 2011, the new 
trial began. (R., pp.112-118.) 
At the beginning of the trial, the jury was read the information and was told that 
the charges involved thirteen-year-old Bonnie Noe. (Tr.4/26/11, p.11, L.24 - p.14, L.9.) 1 
Then, during voir dire, the district court told the jury the alleged victim was B.H.2 
(TrA/26/11, p.34, Ls.14-15.) 
The State's first witness was B.H. (Tr., p.6, Ls.3-17.) B.H. provided testimony 
that she had engaged in sexual activity with Mr. Frauenberger when she was thirteen on 
three occasions, and that he had provided her with marijuana on one occasion. (See 
generally Tr., p.7, L.3 - p.76, L.16.) During cross examination, B.H. was asked if she is 
"Bonnie No[e]"; she responded, "I guess, yeah." (Tr., p.83, Ls.23-24.) Isabella Maw 
testified that she was sneaking out with B.H. and verified that the two had contact with 
Mr. Frauenberger on one of the nights that the alleged lewd conduct occurred. (See 
generally Tr., p.131, L.15 - p.160, L.3.) Paul Nigg testified that he had seen 
Mr. Frauenberger with B.H. on a couple of occasions, did not see any illegal activities 
involving B.H., but did tease Mr. Frauenberger about rumors that Mr. Frauenberger had 
sexual contact with B.H. (See general/yTr., p.160, L.11 - p.214, L.9.) 
The State's final witness was Officer Smith. Officer Smith investigated the 
charges and discussed his interviews with both B.H. and Mr. Frauenberger. (See 
1 For ease of citation, the original trial transcript will be cited to as Tr., all other 
transcripts will also include a relevant date. 
2 Although the district court used B.H.'s entire name throughout proceedings, she will be 
referenced only as B.H. on appeal. It is important to note that B.H.'s first name is not 
Bonnie, nor is it related to or similar to the name Bonnie. 
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generally Tr., p.215, L.3 - p.264, L.21.) During Officer Smith's testimony, the State 
began asking questions about the number of thirteen year-olds that Officer Smith had 
interviewed and whether or not S.H.'s behavior was "usual." (Tr., p.233, Ls.5-21.) 
Defense counsel objected several times. (Tr., p.233, Ls.5-21.) As the questioning 
continued, defense counsel objected on the grounds that the testimony was invading 
the province of the jury by vouching for the credibility of the S.H. (Tr., p.234, Ls.5-10.) 
The questioning then continued, but in a more general nature regarding Officer Smith's 
interviews with children in the past. (Tr., p.234, L.12 - p.238, L.3.) The State then 
asked how similar S.H.'s interview was to other interviews Officer Smith had completed. 
(Tr., p.238, LsA-10.) Officer Smith answered: 
I was just wanting to - I guess I was wanting to make sure we weren't 
getting into a state where we were too comfortable with each other, and I 
wanted to communicate with [S.H.] that I wanted to ensure that she was 
telling me the truth. And I felt that we were at a very comfortable point in 
the interview where she was becoming very comfortable in talking to me. I 
didn't believe, at that point, that she was lying necessarily. 
(Tr., p.238, Ls.11-19.) Defense counsel objected and the district court struck the last 
sentence from the record and told the jury to not "consider the witness' belief as to 
whether the victim was telling the truth or not." (Tr., p.238, Ls.20-25.) 
Later, after discussing Officer Smith's interview with Mr. Frauenberger, the 
prosecution asked Officer Smith if Mr. Frauenberger "indicate[d] to you whether or not 
he had ever been placed on probation for having been possessing marijuana." 
(Tr., p.247, Ls.10-12.) Office Smith answered, "Yes, he did." (Tr., p.247, L.13.) 
Defense counsel again objected and asked to be heard outside the presence of the jury. 
(Tr., p.247, Ls.14-23.) 
Defense counsel then made a motion for mistrial based upon two grounds: that 
the State improperly brought up, for the first time, Mr. Frauenberger's criminal history 
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when the conviction was not a felony or related to truthfulness, and that after several 
objections the State continued with a line of questioning that resulted in Officer Smith 
vouching for the credibility of B.H. (Tr., p.248, L.9 - p.249, L.12.) The prosecution 
agreed that it was improper to have asked about probation; that the prosecutor was 
"misreading my questions"; that a jury instruction would address the issue; and that 
Officer Smith was not bolstering B.H.'s credibility, but was responding to an inference 
defense counsel made during cross-examination about Officer Smith shaking his head. 
(Tr., p.249, L.15 - p.250, L.21.) Defense counsel responded that he agreed limited 
questioning was appropriate; that he did not object to the initial questioning about the 
area he touched on in cross-examination, but that the questioning went too far; the 
judge recognized that, struck the statement, told the jury to disregard it, but that it is 
difficult for a jury to do, and now that the jury has heard two totally improper things; that 
a jury instruction is not sufficient; and that a "mistrial with prejudice is the appropriate 
remedy here." (Tr., p.250, L.23 - p.251, L.19.) 
The district court had the court reporter read the question again. (Tr., p.251, 
Ls.20-25.) The district court then held that although the questioning was improper, both 
eliciting vouching testimony and eliciting testimony about Mr. Frauenberger being on 
probation, that because no answer was giving to the probation question and 
Mr. Frauenberger's use of marijuana had been addressed, that the motion for mistrial 
would be denied. (Tr., p.252, L.7 - p.254, L.5.) The district court then struck the 
question and told the jury not to consider it. (Tr., p.254, Ls.16-19.) 
The State rested. (Tr., p.264, L.25 - p.265, L.1.) Following a Rule 29 motion, 
the district court dismissed Count IV, delivering marijuana to a person under the age of 
eighteen. (Tr., p.266, L.13 - p.267, L.18.) 
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Defense counsel then called Mr. Frauenberger who testified that he did not have 
sexual contact with S.H., did not provide her with marijuana, and discussed the fact that 
he was on probation for possession of marijuana. (See generally Tr., p.269, L.10 -
p.327, L.10.) Defense counsel specifically noted that since the probation had been 
brought up by the State that they were now going to address it though 
Mr. Frauenberger's testimony. (Tr., p.290, Ls.17-21.) The defense then rested. 
(Tr., p.327, Ls.22-23.) 
The State presented a very brief rebuttal. (Tr., p.370, L.17 - p.387, L.12.) 
During rebuttal, the State called Aletia Straub, Mr. Frauenberger's probation officer. 
(Tr., p.377, L.10 - p.378, L.3.) During her testimony she mentioned that in August of 
2009, there had been a probation violation hearing. (Tr., p.381, Ls.3-11.) 
During closing argument, the prosecution continued to commit misconduct by 
vouching for the alleged victim and appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jury. 
(Tr.4/28/11, p.186, L.6 - p.198, L.18.) 
The jury was instructed that in order to find Mr. Frauenberger guilty of counts one 
and two it must find that: 
3. the defendant Robert Joseph Frauenberger committed manual-genital 
contact upon or with the body of [B.H.],3 
4. [B.H.] was a child under the age of sixteen (16) years of age ... 
(R., pp.89-90.) On count three the jury was instructed: 
3. The defendant Robert Joseph Frauenberger committed oral-genital 
contact upon or with the body of [B. H.], 
4. [B.H.] was a child under sixteen (16) years of age ... 
3 B.H.'s full name was used in the jury instructions. 
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(Augmentation, Jury Instruction Number 10l On count five, the jury was instructed 
that, "3. the defendant Robert Joseph Frauenberger delivered any amount of marijuana 
to [S.H.], a person who was under 18 years old ... " (R., p.91.) B.H.'s full name, not 
Bonnie Noe, is used in several other jury instructions, but the name Bonnie Noe does 
not appear in any instructions. (R., pp.80-105.) 
After deliberation, the jury returned guilty verdicts on all of the remaining charges. 
(R., pp.107-108.) 
Later, defense counsel filed a Motion for New Trial based upon the prosecutorial 
misconduct that occurred during the trial. (R., pp.119-123.) The motion was denied. 
(R., pp.133-134.) The case proceeded to sentencing. The State recommended a 
unified sentence of eleven years, with five years fixed, for each charge, to be run 
concurrently. (Tr., p.411, L.20 - p.412, L.1.) Defense counsel requested that the 
district court withhold judgment and place Mr. Frauenberger on probation. (Tr., p.405, 
Ls.12-14.) Additionally, the presentence investigator recommended that the district 
court retain jurisdiction. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.12.) 
Mr. Frauenberger was sentenced to unified sentences of ten years, with two years fixed, 
for the lewd conduct charges, and four years, with one year fixed, for the delivery of 
marijuana charge, to be served concurrently. (Augmentation: Judgment of Conviction -
Order of Commitment ***Re-Corrected***.) Mr. Frauenberger filed a Notice of Appeal 
timely from the Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.139-141.) 
4 Mr. Frauenberger filed a Motion to Augment on May 3, 2012. It has not been ruled on 
upon the filing of this Appellant's Brief. 
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ISSUES 
1. Was the evidence presented at trial insufficient to support the jury's verdicts 
finding Mr. Frauenberger guilty of lewd conduct or delivery of marijuana to 
Bonnie Noe? 
2. Were the charges for which Mr. Frauenberger was ultimately convicted, related 
to criminal conduct involving a minor victim B.H., charges for which no 
information or indictment had been filed and for which subject matter jurisdiction 
had not been conferred? 
3. Did the district court create a fatal variance from the State's information when it 
instructed the jury that the charges involved the minor victim S.H. instead of 
Bonnie Noe as alleged in the information? 
4. Did the State violate Mr. Frauenberger's right to a fair trial by committing 
prosecutorial misconduct? 
5. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed, upon 
Mr. Frauenberger, unified sentences of ten years, with two years fixed, for the 
lewd conduct charges, and four years, with one year fixed, for the delivery of 




The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Insufficient To Support The Jury'S Verdicts 
Finding Mr. Frauenberger Guilty Of Lewd Conduct Or Delivery Of Marijuana To Bonnie 
Noe 
A. Introduction 
A jury convicted Mr. Frauenberger of three counts of lewd conduct and one count 
of delivery of marijuana to a person under the age of eighteen. The Third Amended 
Criminal Information listed Bonnie Noe as the alleged minor victim involved in each 
count. However, no evidence as trial was presented concerning the alleged victim, 
thirteen year-old Bonnie Noe. As such, Mr. Frauenberger asserts that the evidence 
presented at trial was insufficient to support the convictions because the State failed to 
provide substantial competent evidence to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
Mr. Frauenberger engaged in inappropriate sexual contact with Bonnie Noe or provided 
her with marijuana. 
B. The Evidence Presented At Trial Was Insufficient To Support The JUry'S Verdicts 
Finding Mr. Frauenberger Guilty Of Lewd Conduct Or Delivery Of Marijuana To 
Bonnie Noe 
A Judgment of Conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, must be overturned on 
appeal where there lacks substantial competent evidence upon which a reasonable trier 
of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the 
essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Corlez, 135 Idaho 
561,562 (2001); State v. Nelson, 131 Idaho 210,219 (Ct. App. 1998). "For evidence to 
be substantial, it must be of sufficient quality that reasonable minds could reach the 
same conclusion." State v. Johnson, 131 Idaho 808, 809 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing Bott v. 
Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 128 Idaho 580, 586 (1996)). 
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On appellate review, the significance of the evidence will not be reweighed as it 
relates to specific elements of the crime, instead the Court will examine the supporting 
evidence. State v. Thomas, 133 Idaho 172, 174 (Ct. App. 1999). When reviewing the 
evidence for sufficiency to support the jury verdict, the reviewing Court will review all of 
the trial evidence, including testimony presented by the defendant. State v. Brown, 131 
Idaho 61, 71 (Ct. App. 1998). This Court does not substitute its view of the evidence for 
that of the jury with regard to matters of the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to 
attach to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the 
evidence. State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385 (Ct. App. 1998). Additionally, the 
Court will construe all of the evidence in favor of upholding the verdict. State v. Glass, 
139 Idaho 815,818 (2004). 
Mr. Frauenberger was charged, by information, with three counts of lewd conduct 
with a child under the age of sixteen and two counts of delivery of marijuana to a person 
under the age of eighteen. (R., pp.18-21.) The charges specifically listed that the illegal 
contact had occurred with thirteen year-old "Bonnie Noe." (R., pp.18-21.) The 
Information was amended several times, but the crimes charged and listed victim did 
not change. (R., pp.37-40, 46-49, 75-77.) At the beginning of the trial, the jury was 
read the information and was told that the charges involved thirteen-year-old "Bonnie 
Noe." (Tr.4/26/11, p.11, L.24 - p.14, L.9.) However, no evidence was ever provided as 
to Bonnie Noe's involvement with Mr. Frauenberger. 
In this case, the State's evidence was as follows: The State's first witness was 
S.H. (Tr., p.6, Ls.3-17.) B.H. provided testimony that she had engaged in sexual 
activity with Mr. Frauenberger when she was thirteen on three occasions and that he 
had provided her with marijuana on one occasion. (See generally Tr., p.7, L.3 - p.76, 
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L.16.) During cross examination, B.H. was asked if she is "Bonnie No[e)"; she 
responded, "I guess, yeah." (Tr., p.83, Ls.23-24.) Isabella Maw testified that she was 
sneaking out with B.H. and verified that the two had contact with Mr. Frauenberger on 
one of the nights that the alleged lewd conduct occurred. (See generally Tr., p.131, 
L.15 - p.160, L.3.) Paul Nigg testified that he had seen Mr. Frauenberger with B.H. on 
a couple of occasions, did not see any illegal activities involving B.H., but did tease 
Mr. Frauenberger about rumors that Mr. Frauenberger had sexual contact with B.H. 
(See generally Tr., p.160, L.11 - p.214, L.9.) The State's final witness was Officer 
Smith. Officer Smith investigated the charges and discussed his interviews with both 
B.H. and Mr. Frauenberger. (See generally Tr., p.215, L.3 - p.264, L.21.) 
B.H.'s response to defense counsel's question that she guessed she was Bonnie 
Noe is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that the State intended to use 
Bonnie Noe as an alias for B.H. or to create a fictitious name for B.H. to protect her 
identity. Traditionally, a child's initials are used instead of their full name to protect the 
identity of the child. I.R.C.P.3(c)(1)(b). Because no testimony, which could satisfy the 
reasonable doubt standard, was offered to the jury explaining to them that Bonnie Noe 
was somehow B.H., they were left to presume that Bonnie Noe was not B.H. The State 
failed to present any evidence regarding Bonnie Noe at trial. 
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution precludes conviction 
except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the 
crime with which a defendant is charged. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); 
see also State v. Gittens, 129 Idaho 54, 57 (Ct. App. 1996). There was no evidence, 
much less substantial and competent evidence, presented that proved, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that B.H. was Bonnie Noe or that Mr. Frauenberger had any sexual 
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contact or provided marijuana to Bonnie Noe. Because this showing was essential in 
order to establish the State's charges beyond a reasonable doubt, there was no 
evidence that would support a finding of guilt on any of the charges and the convictions 
must be overturned. 
II. 
The Charges For Which Mr. Frauenberger Was Ultimately Convicted, Related To 
Criminal Conduct Involving A Minor Victim B.H., Were Charges For Which No 
Information Or Indictment Had Been Filed And For Which Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
Had Not Been Conferred 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Frauenberger was charged with three counts of lewd conduct and one count 
of delivery of marijuana to a minor, all charges specifically noting that Bonnie Noe was 
the alleged victim. No evidence was presented at trial that Bonnie Noe was a victim. 
However, evidence was presented at trial which showed that Mr. Frauenberger may 
have committed similar crimes involving another minor, B.H. Although the information 
charged Mr. Frauenberger with committing these crimes against Bonnie Noe, the jury 
was instructed that it must find Mr. Frauenberger guilty if they believed he has 
committed these crimes against B.H. Because Mr. Frauenberger had never been 
charged with committing lewd conduct against B.H. or providing marijuana to B.H., the 
district court did not have jurisdiction to aI/ow the jury to make a finding on 
Mr. Frauenberger's guilt as to those charges that had never been filed. 
B. The Charges For Which Mr. Frauenberger Was Ultimately Convicted, Related To 
Criminal Conduct Involving A Minor Victim B.H., Were Charges For Which No 
Information Or Indictment Had Been Filed And For Which Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction Had Not Been Conferred 
Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of law, over which the appellate 
courts exercise free review. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757 (2004). In a criminal 
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case, the filing of an information alleging that an offense was committed within the State 
of Idaho confers subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 757-58. Because the information 
provides subject matter jurisdiction to the district court, the district court's jurisdictional 
power depends on the charging document being legally sufficient to survive challenge. 
Id. at 758. Whether a charging document conforms to the requirements of law and is 
legally sufficient is also a question of law subject to free review. Id. 
A challenge to the jurisdictional efficiency of a charging information is never 
waived and may be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal. State v. 
Cook, 143 Idaho 323, 326 (Ct. App. 2006); Jones, 140 Idaho at 758. When the 
information's jurisdictional sufficiency is challenged after trial, it will be upheld unless it 
is so defective that it does not, by any fair or reasonable construction, charge the 
offense for which the defendant was convicted. Jones, 140 Idaho at 759; State v. 
Robran, 119 Idaho 285, 287 (Ct.App.1991). A reviewing court has considerable leeway 
to imply the necessary allegations from the language of the information. Jones, 140 
Idaho at 759; Robran, 119 Idaho at 287. In short, when considering a post-trial 
challenge to the jurisdictional sufficiency of the information, a reviewing court need only 
determine that, at a minimum, the information contains a statement of the territorial 
jurisdiction of the court below and a citation to the applicable section of the Idaho Code. 
Cook, 143 Idaho at 326; State v. Quintero, 141 Idaho 619, 622 (2005). 
Mr. Frauenberger does not challenge that the information is defective. He 
asserts that he was properly tried for the crimes involving Bonnie Noe, but that sufficient 
information was not provided for the jury to return guilty verdicts on those charges. See 
section I above. Mr. Frauenberger instead and alternatively asserts that he had never 
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been charged for crimes associated with an alleged victim named B.H. Therefore, there 
was no jurisdiction for the district court to instruct the jury on crimes related to B.H. 
In the case at hand, Mr. Frauenberger was charged, by information, with three 
counts of lewd conduct with a child under the age of sixteen and two counts of delivery 
of marijuana to a person under the age of eighteen. (R., pp.18-21.) The charges 
specifically listed that the illegal contact had occurred with thirteen year-old "Bonnie 
Noe." (R., pp.18-21.) At the beginning of the trial, the jury was read the information and 
was told that the charges involved thirteen-year-old "Bonnie Noe." (Tr.4/26/11, p.11, 
L.24 - p.14, L.9.) However, after the close of evidence, the jury was instructed that in 
order to find Mr. Frauenberger guilty of counts one and two it must find that: 
3. the defendant Robert Joseph Frauenberger committed manual-genital 
contact upon or with the body of [B.H.], 
4. [B.H.] was a child under the age of sixteen (16) years of age ... 
(R., pp.89-90.) On count three the jury was instructed: 
3. The defendant Robert Joseph Frauenberger committed oral-genital 
contact upon or with the body of [B.H.], 
4. [B.H.] was a child under sixteen (16) years of age ... 
(Augmentation, Jury Instruction Number 10.) On count five, the jury was instructed that, 
"3. the defendant Robert Joseph Frauenberger delivered any amount of marijuana to 
[B.H.], a person who was under 18 years old ... " (R., p.91.) B.H.'s full name, not 
Bonnie Noe, is used in several other jury instructions, but the name Bonnie Noe does 
not appear in any instructions. (R., pp.80-105.) 
A legally sufficient information must adequately set forth the nature and 
circumstances of the offense charged to enable a person of ordinary understanding to 
know what is intended in the charge. State v. Lenz, 103 Idaho 632, 633-34 (Ct. App. 
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1982); I.C. § 19-1409. Further, the information should reflect the name of the 
prosecutrix as such data is an essential part of the charge against a defendant for lewd 
and lascivious conduct. State v. Thurlow, 85 Idaho 96, 103 (1962). In this case, there 
is no information charging Mr. Frauenberger with any criminal actions involving B.H. 
The information filed conferred jurisdiction only for the crimes charged involving Bonnie 
Noe. 
Therefore, Mr. Frauenberger asserts that while many of the elements would be 
the same for the crimes for which he was charged and the crimes for which the jury was 
asked to determine guilt, they are not the charges for which jurisdiction had been 
conferred. Because there was no jurisdiction for the district court to allow the jury to 
make a determination as to Mr. Frauenberger's potential guilt associated with his 
possible actions involving B.H., he asserts that his convictions must be vacated. 
III. 
The District Court Created A Fatal Variance From The State's Information When It 
Instructed The Jury That The Charges Involved The Minor Victim B.H.! Instead Of 
Bonnie Noe As Alleged In The Information 
A. Introduction 
The district court created an impermissible variance when it failed to limit the 
element instruction for each of the charges to those overt acts alleged in the 
Information; specifically, that the alleged victim was Bonnie Noe, not B.H. as the jury 
was instructed. The jury was allowed to find Mr. Frauenberger guilty of three counts of 
lewd conduct and one count of delivery of marijuana to a minor if it believed that the 
alleged victim was B.H. However, Mr. Frauenberger was charged with these same 
offenses with a different minor, Bonnie Noe. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a variance exists between the charging document and the evidence 
presented at trial or between the information and the jury instructions is a question of 
law over which an appellate court exercises free review. See State v. Brazil, 136 Idaho 
327, 330 (Ct. App. 2001). Although Mr. Frauenberger's counsel did not object to the 
variances during the trial proceedings, this Court can review these errors for the first 
time on appeal as fundamental error. In order to meet Idaho's fundamental error 
standard: 
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's 
unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or 
obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in 
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to 
object was a tactical decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate 
that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning. .. that 
it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226 (2010). The defendant must prove that the error was 
not harmless by demonstrating "a reasonable possibility that the error affected the 
outcome of the trial." Id. 
The error in the instant case is fundamental under Perry. Mr. Frauenberger is 
challenging a variance from the charging document which he alleges is fatal, i.e., a 
violation of his right to due process that leaves him open to the risk of double jeopardy. 
See State v. Wolfrum, 145 Idaho 44, 47 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding that a variance 
between from the charging document requires reversal when it deprives a defendant of 
his substantial rights by violating the defendant's right to fair notice or leaving him open 
to the risk of double jeopardy); State v. Cariaga, 95 Idaho 900,903-04 (1974) ("Because 
the variance between the complaint and conviction denies the appellant due process of 
law, she has not waived her right to object even though no objection has been 
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previously made."). As such, Mr. Frauenberger is challenging a violation of his 
constitutional rights. Next, the error in this case is clear and obvious. In the instant 
case, there is nothing indicating that defense counsel for Mr. Frauenberger intentionally 
waived the variance and there is no reasonable tactical decision for failing to object to 
the jury instructions varying from the charging document. Finally, Mr. Frauenberger's 
substantial rights were affected as he is left open to the risk of double jeopardy 
because, although the jury found him guilty of committing crimes associated with B.H., 
the information charges him with crimes associated with Bonnie Noe, thereby allowing 
the State to potentially recharge him in a case listing the victim as B.H., subjecting him 
to punishment for crimes for which he has already been punished. 
C. The District Court Created A Fatal Variance From The State's Information When 
It Instructed The Jury That The Charges Involved The Minor Victim B.H.! Instead 
Of Bonnie Noe As Alleged In The Information 
"A criminal defendant is entitled to be apprised by the charging instrument not 
only of the name of the offense charged but in general terms of the manner in which it is 
alleged to have been committed." Brazil, 136 Idaho at 331 (citing I.C. §§ 19-1303,-
1409 (charging instrument must contain a statement of the acts constituting the 
offense); I.C. § 19-1411 (charging instrument must be direct and certain as it regards 
the particular circumstances of the offense charged); State v. McMahan, 57 Idaho 240, 
246-47 (1937) (holding that an information must not only state the name of the alleged 
crime but also inform the accused as to how it is claimed the accused committed the 
offense.)). 
A determination of whether a variance is fatal depends on whether or not the 
basic functions of the pleading requirement have been met. As stated by the United 
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States Supreme Court in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 (1935), overruled on 
other grounds by Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960): 
The true inquiry ... is not whether there has been a variance in proof, but 
whether there has been such a variance as to 'affect the substantial rights' 
of the accused. The general rule that allegations and proof must 
correspond is based upon the obvious requirements (1) that the accused 
shall be definitely informed as to the charges against him, so that he may 
be enabled to present his defense and not be taken by surprise by the 
evidence offered at the trial; and (2) that he may be protected against 
another prosecution for the same offense. 
Therefore, a variance is held to require reversal of the conviction only when it deprives 
the defendant of his right to fair notice or leaves him open to the risk of double jeopardy. 
State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410,417-18 (1985); Brazil, 136 Idaho at 330-31; State v. 
Love, 76 Idaho 378,381(1955).5 However, 
commentators have argued that the double jeopardy element is no longer 
as vital a function of the pleading document as it once was since now 
transcripts of the trial itself are available and more readily relied on to 
establish what was before the court and jury and ultimately resolved by 
them, as a bar to future prosecutions. 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Modern 
Criminal Procedure, § 19.2(b), at 446 (1984), citing State v. Smith, 102 
Idaho 108, 626 P.2d 206 (1981). "Accordingly, it is argued, 'protection 
against successive prosecutions for the same offense ... [should] not 
require of an accusation any more completeness than the notice function 
demands.'" 2 W. LaFave & J. Israel, supra, § 19.2(b) at 446, quoting Scott, 
Fairness in the Accusation of Crime, 41 Minn.L.Rev. 509, 516-17 (1957). 
Windsor, 110 Idaho at 418, n.1. 
In the case at hand, Mr. Frauenberger was charged, by information, with three 
counts of lewd conduct with a child under the age of sixteen and two counts of delivery 
of marijuana to a person under the age of eighteen. (R., pp.18-21.) The charges 
5 There are two types of variances: variances involving a difference between the 
allegations in the charging instrument and the proof adduced at trial, and variances 
involving a difference between the allegations in the charging instrument and the jury 
instructions. State v. Montoya, 140 Idaho 160, 165 (Ct. App. 2004). The analysis for 
both types of variances is the same. Compare, e.g., Windsor, 110 Idaho at 417-18, with 
Love, 76 Idaho at 381. 
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specifically listed that the illegal contact had occurred with thirteen year-old "Bonnie 
Noe." (R., pp.18-21.) At the beginning of the trial, the jury was read the information and 
was told that the charges involved thirteen-year-old "Bonnie Noe." (TrAI26/11, p.11, 
L.24 - p.14, L.9.) However, after the close of evidence, the jury was instructed that in 
order to find Mr. Frauenberger guilty of counts one and two it must find that: 
3. the defendant Robert Joseph Frauenberger committed manual-genital 
contact upon or with the body of [B.H.], 
4. [B.H.] was a child under the age of sixteen (16) years of age ... 
(R., pp.89-90.) On count three the jury was instructed: 
3. The defendant Robert Joseph Frauenberger committed oral-genital 
contact upon or with the body of [B.H.], 
4. [B.H.] was a child under sixteen (16) years of age ... 
(Augmentation, Jury Instruction Number 10.) On count five, the jury was instructed that, 
"3. the defendant Robert Joseph Frauenberger delivered any amount of marijuana to 
[B.H.], a person who was under 18 years old ... " (R., p.91.) B.H.'s full name, not 
Bonnie Noe, is used in several other jury instructions, but the name Bonnie Noe does 
not appear in any instructions. (R., pp.80-105.) 
These instructions clearly do not describe the same crimes for which 
Mr. Frauenberger was charged. Mr. Frauenberger asserts that the switching of the 
alleged victim's name from Bonnie Noe to B.H. created a fatal variance, violating 
Mr. Frauenberger's right to due process and potentially subjecting him to additional 
punishment. While Mr. Frauenberger does not assert a variance in regards to a lack of 
notice, he does acknowledge that his variance claim may need to be addressed under 
the notice standard. A review of whether the defendant was deprived of his or her right 
to fair notice requires the court to determine whether the record suggests the possibility 
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that the defendant was misled or embarrassed in the preparation or presentation of his 
or her defense. Brazil, 136 Idaho at 330. Certainly, not being correctly informed of the 
identity of the alleged victim would mislead a defendant and greatly affect the defense 
presented. Similarly, Mr. Frauenberger's substantial rights were affected as he is left 
open to the risk of double jeopardy because although the jury found him guilty of 
committing crimes associated with B.H. the information charges him with crimes 
associated with Bonnie Noe and the State may potentially recharge him in a case listing 
the victim as B.H., subjecting him to punishment for crimes for which he has already 
been punished. 
Therefore, because the district court created a variance and thereby violated 
Mr. Frauenberger's right to due process and leaves him open to the risk of double 
jeopardy, and because he meets all three prongs of Idaho's fundamental error test, 
Mr. Frauenberger's conviction must be vacated. 
IV. 
The State Violated Mr. Frauenberger's Right To A Fair Trial By Committing 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
U[I]t [is] the duty of the Government to establish ... guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. This notion-basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society-is a 
requirement and a safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of 
'due process.'" Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-803 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that, U[n]o 
person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " 
U.S. CONST. amend. V. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment states, U[n]o state 
shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Additionally, the Idaho Constitution also guarantees that, 
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"[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 
10. CONST. art. I, § 13. Due process requires criminal trials to be fundamentally fair. 
Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978). Prosecutorial misconduct may so 
unfairly contaminate the trial as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due 
process. State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318 (Ct. App. 2005); Greer v. Miller, 483 
U.S. 756, 765 (1987). In order to constitute a due process violation, the prosecutorial 
misconduct must be of sufficient consequence to result in the denial of the defendant's 
right to a fair trial. Id. The hallmark of due process analysis in cases of alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor. 
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982). The aim of due process is not the 
punishment of society for the misdeeds of the prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial 
to the accused. Id. 
A. Standard Of Review 
Because Mr. Frauenberger's prosecutorial misconduct claims are grounded in 
constitutional principles, they involve questions of law over which this Court exercises 
free review. City of Boise v. Frazier, 143 Idaho 1,2 (2006). Trial error ordinarily will not 
be addressed on appeal unless a timely objection was made in the trial court. State v. 
Adams, 147 Idaho 857, 861 (Ct. App. 2009). For alleged errors for which there was a 
timely objection, Mr. Frauenberger only has the duty to prove that an error occurred, "at 
which point the State has the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222 (2010). On appeal, 
Mr. Frauenberger also raises instances of un-objected to misconduct. Because these 
claims of error are raised for the first time on appeal, Mr. Frauenberger must establish 
that the errors are reviewable as "fundamental error." Id. The Idaho Supreme Court 
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recently revisited fundamental error and stated that to obtain relief on appeal for 
fundamental error: 
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the defendant's 
unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the error must be clear or 
obvious, without the need for any additional information not contained in 
the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to 
object was a tactical decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate 
that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. 
Id. (footnote omitted). Thus, on a claim of fundamental error, a defendant must first 
show that the alleged error "violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived 
constitutional rights," and that the error "plainly exists" in that the error was plain, clear, 
or obvious. Id. at 228. If the alleged error satisfies the first two elements of the Perry 
test, the error is reviewable. Id. To obtain appellate relief, however, the defendant must 
further persuade the reviewing court that the error was not harmless, i.e., that there is a 
reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial. Id. at 226-228. 
B. The State Violated Mr. Frauenberger's Right To A Fair Trial By Committing 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
1. Misconduct For Which There Was An Objection: The Prosecution 
Committed Misconduct By Eliciting Vouching Testimony From Officer 
Smith, And By Asking Officer Smith Whether Mr. Frauenberger Was On 
Probation For Possessing Marijuana 
a. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Encroaching Upon The 
Province Of The Jury By Eliciting Vouching Testimony From Officer 
Smith 
The prosecution committed misconduct in this case by asking a witness to testify 
about the credibility of the alleged victim, a clear and obvious error. "Statements by a 
witness as to whether another witness is telling the truth are prohibited." State v. 
Johnson, 119 Idaho 852, 857 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 
336 (8th Cir. 1986); State v. Batangan, 71 Haw. 552, 799 P.2d 48 (1990); State v. 
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Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986); State v. Fitzgerald, 39 Wash. App. 652, 
694, P.2d 1117 (1985); State v. Keen, 309 N.C. 158, 305 S.E.2d 535 (1983)). 
Testimony from lay witnesses regarding issues of credibility is inadmissible. See 
Reynolds v. State, 126 Idaho 24,31 (Ct. App. 1994). 
During the State's examination of Officer Smith, the State began asking 
questions about the number of thirteen year-olds that Officer Smith had interviewed and 
whether or not B.H.'s behavior was "usual." (Tr., p.233, Ls.5-21.) Defense counsel 
objected several times. (Tr., p.233, Ls.5-21.) As the questioning continued, defense 
counsel objected on the grounds that the testimony was invading the province of the 
jury by vouching for the credibility of the B.H. (Tr., p.234, Ls.5-10.) The questioning 
then continued, but in a more general nature regarding Officer Smith's interviews with 
children in the past. (Tr., p.234, L.12 - p.238, L.3.) The State then asked how similar 
B.H.'s interview was to other interviews Officer Smith had completed. (Tr., p.238, Ls.4-
10.) Officer Smith answered: 
I was just wanting to - I guess I was wanting to make sure we weren't 
getting into a state where we were too comfortable with each other, and I 
wanted to communicate with [B.H.] that I wanted to ensure that she was 
telling me the truth. And I felt that we were at a very comfortable point in 
the interview where she was becoming very comfortable in talking to me. I 
didn't believe, at that point, that she was lying necessarily. 
(Tr., p.238, Ls.11-19 (emphasis added).) Defense counsel objected and the district 
court struck the last sentence from the record and told the jury to not "consider the 
witness' belief as to whether the victim was telling the truth or not." (Tr., p.238, LS.20-
25.) 
The State violated Mr. Frauenberger's right to a jury trial when the prosecutor 
attempted to encroach upon the jury's vital and exclusive function to make credibility 
determinations. The Supreme Court of the Territory of Idaho stated over one-hundred 
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years ago, that a question calling "for the opinion of one witness as to the truthfulness of 
another ... is clearly an invasion of the province of the jury, who are the judges of the 
credibility of witnesses." Perry, 150 Idaho at 229 (quoting People v. Barnes, 2 Idaho 
148, 150 (1886)). This prohibition is not simply a court rule by which trials are 
conducted, but instead, is rooted in one's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized that, 
In a jury trial, it is for the jury to determine the credibility of a witness, not 
another witness. See State v. Batangan, 71 Haw. 552, 799 P.2d 48 
(1990). See also United States v. Samara, 643 F.2d 701 (10th Cir.) cert. 
denied, 454 U.S. 829, 102 S.Ct. 122,70 L.Ed.2d 104 (1981), reh. denied, 
454 U.S. 1094, 102 S.Ct. 662, 70 L.Ed.2d 633 (1981); United States v. 
Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 671 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885, 100 
S.Ct. 179, 62 L.Ed.2d 116 (1979); State v. Hoyt, 806 P.2d 204, 211 (Utah 
App.1991); State v. Ross, 152 Vt. 462, 568 A.2d 335 (1989); State v. 
Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235 (Mo.1984). Statements by a witness as to 
whether another witness is telling the truth are prohibited. See United 
States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336 (8th Cir.1986); Batangan, 71 Haw. 552, 799 
P.2d 48; State v. Lindsey, 149 Ariz. 472, 720 P.2d 73 (1986); State v. 
Fitzgerald, 39 Wash.App. 652, 694 P.2d 1117 (1985); State v. Keen, 309 
N.C. 158, 305 S.E.2d 535 (1983). 
Johnson, 119 Idaho at 857. 
"The right to a jury trial contained in the Sixth Amendment. .. includes the right 
to have the jury be 'the sole judge of the weight of the testimony.''' State v. Elmore, 154 
Wash. App. 885, 228 P.3d 760 (WA 2010) (quoting State v. Lane, 125 Wash.2d 825, 
838,889 P.2d 929 (WA 1995) (quoting State v. Crotts, 22 Wash. 245, 250-51, 60 P. 403 
(1900)). Generally, no witness may offer testimony in the form of an opinion regarding 
the guilt or veracity of the defendant; such testimony is unfairly prejudicial to the 
defendant "because it 'invad[es] the exclusive province of the [jury].'" State v. 
Demery, 144 Wash.2d 753, 759, 30 P.3d 1278, 1282 (WA 2001) (quoting City of 
Seattle v. Heatley, 70 Wash.App. 573, 577, 854 P.2d 658 (1993) (citing State v. Black, 
109 Wash.2d 336, 348, 745 P.2d 12 (1987))). Admitting impermissible opinion 
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testimony regarding the defendant's guilt may be reversible error because admitting 
such evidence "violates [the defendant's] constitutional right to a jury trial, including the 
independent determination of the facts by the jury." Id. (quoting State v. Carlin, 40 
Wash.App. 698, 701, 700 P.2d 323 (1985), overruled on other grounds by City of 
Seattle v. Heatley, 70 Wash.App. 573, 854 P.2d 658 (1993)). 
The questioning of Officer Smith by the prosecution was clearly designed to 
provide Officer Smith an opportunity to share his opinion regarding B.H.'s truthfulness. 
Such opinion testimony is clearly inadmissible. The district court correctly recognized 
that the statement was misconduct. And although a limiting instruction was given, this 
statement, that a trained police officer believed B.H., is the type of evidence that would 
seriously impede a jury's ability to independently judge credibility. As such, a limiting 
instruction was insufficient and a new trial should have been ordered. 
b. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Asking Officer Smith 
Whether Mr. Frauenberger Was On Probation For Possessing 
Marijuana 
After discussing Officer Smith's interview with Mr. Frauenberger, the prosecution 
asked Officer Smith if Mr. Frauenberger "indicate[d] to you whether or not he had ever 
been placed on probation for having been possessing marijuana." (Tr., p.247, LS.10-
12.) Office Smith answered, "Yes, he did." (Tr., p.247, L 13.) Defense counsel again 
objected and asked to be heard outside the presence of the jury. (Tr., p.247, Ls.14-23.) 
Later, the prosecution admitted that it was improper to have asked about probation, that 
the prosecutor was "misreading my questions." (Tr., p.449, Ls.15-22.) 
Recently the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
We long ago held, "It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that a defendant 
has a fair trial, and that nothing but competent evidence is submitted to 
the jury." State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 44, 71 P. 608, 611 (1903). They 
should not "exert their skill and ingenuity to see how far they can trespass 
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upon the verge of error, [because] generally in so doing they transgress 
upon the rights of the accused." /d. 
State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463,469 (2007). 
The above question is clearly improper and constitutes prosecutorial misconduct. 
Information that Mr. Frauenberger had a criminal record, especially related to 
possessing marijuana, when a marijuana charge is at issue, is highly prejudicial. Again, 
this is the type of information that may interfere with the jury's ability to make an 
impartial decision about whether or not Mr. Frauenberger is innocent of the charges 
against him. As such, he asserts the proper remedy, was to grant a new trial. 
c. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying 
Mr. Frauenberger's Motion For Mistrial 
Mr. Frauenberger asserts that the district court abused its discretion in denying 
his motion for a mistrial. A motion for a mistrial is controlled by I.C.R. 29.1, which 
provides that, "ra] mistrial may be declared upon motion of the defendant, when there 
occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct inside or 
outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant 
of a fair trial." I.C.R. 29.1 (a); State v. Cane/o, 129 Idaho 386, 389 (Ct. App. 1996). The 
decision whether to grant a mistrial rests within the sound discretion of the district court 
and, absent an abuse of discretion, it will not be disturbed on appeal. /d.; State v. 
Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 818 (Ct. App. 1993). The Supreme Court has held that the 
question on review is not whether the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion 
under the circumstances existing when the motion was made; but, whether the event or 
events which brought about the motion for mistrial constitute reversible error when 
viewed in the context of the entire record. /d. 
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In cases where juries have been exposed to extraneous information or other 
improper influences, the Idaho Supreme Court has followed an approach similar to the 
approach adopted by the federal courts and declined to require a determination of 
actual prejudice. Roll v. City of Middleton, 115 Idaho 833, 837 (Ct. App. 1989). These 
courts have generally held that if the trial judge finds that the extraneous information 
reasonably could have resulted in prejudice a new trial should be ordered. Id. 
Consequently, the Idaho Court of Appeals has held that the proper standard is 
whether prejudice reasonably could have occurred, rather than, whether prejudice 
actually has occurred. Id. The Court's holding relies on two considerations: 
First, the extreme rigor of an actual prejudice test would severely restrict 
the availability of relief for misconduct, thereby diminishing public 
confidence in the jury system and eroding the fundamental principle that a 
"verdict must be based upon the evidence developed at the triaL" United 
States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 867 (5th Cir.1975) (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 
366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961)). Second, Rule 606(b), !.R.E., precludes a full 
inquiry into actual prejudice. As mentioned above, Rule 606(b) bars jurors 
from giving evidence concerning their mental processes. Because jurors 
cannot be questioned as to whether they were in fact prejudiced by 
extraneous information, the trial judge must determine whether the 
information reasonably could have produced prejudice, when evaluated in 
light of all the events and the evidence at trial. 
Id. Therefore, it is sufficient for the judge to merely determine whether prejudice 
reasonably could have occurred. Id. at 839. In making this determination, courts must 
give due regard to "the policy of assuring that jury verdicts are based upon the evidence 
at trial, not upon extraneous information or improper influences." Id. 
Further, a trial court's declaration of mistrial and dismissal of charges against a 
defendant because of prosecutorial misconduct during trial prevents retrial. State v. 
Stevens, 126 Idaho 822,830 (1995). 
In the case at hand, following improper vouching questions and an improper 
question about Mr. Frauenberger being on probation, defense counsel made a motion 
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for mistrial based upon two grounds: that the State improperly brought up, for the first 
time, Mr. Frauenberger's criminal history when the conviction was not a felony or related 
to truthfulness, and that after several objections the State continued with a line of 
questioning that resulted in Officer Smith vouching for the credibility of S.H. (Tr., p.248, 
L.9 - p.249, L.12.) The prosecution agreed that it was improper to have asked about 
probation; that she was "misreading my questions"; that a jury instruction would address 
the issue; and that Officer Smith was not bolstering S.H.'s credibility, but was 
responding to an inference defense counsel made during cross-examination about 
Officer Smith shaking his head. (Tr., p.249, L.15 - p.250, L.21.) Defense counsel 
responded that he agreed limited questioning was appropriate; that he did not object to 
the initial questioning about the area he touched on in cross-examination, but that the 
questioning went too far; the judge recognized that, struck the statement, told the jury to 
disregard it, but that it is difficult for a jury to do, and now that they have heard two 
totally improper things; that a jury instruction is not sufficient; and that a "mistrial with 
prejudice is the appropriate remedy here." (Tr., p.250, L.23 - p.251, L.19.) 
The district court had the court reporter read the question again. (Tr., p.251, 
Ls.20-25.) The district court then held that: 
Mr. Archibald raises two issues for grounds for the mistrial. The 
first surrounds the witness' statement that he didn't believe that she was 
not telling the truth. And that particular testimony came at a time, as 
counsel points out, where there were some objections to that particular 
line of questioning. The Court had given some guidance as to the 
demeanor of the witness. The witness had talked about the experience 
that he had had in interviewing children and the differences between the 
kinds of responses you would expect between adults and children. The 
Court felt that that line of questioning was appropriate and had given 
admonitions not to vouch for the credibility. 
At the time the statement was made by the witness that he didn't 
believe that at that time she was not telling the truth, the Court - I don't 
know if it was by objection or quickly perceiving that issue, did give a 
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limiting instruction and not just sustained the objection but quickly asked 
the jury not to consider that. So the Court is satisfied that the appropriate 
remedy was undertaken with regard to that issue. 
The referencing by the prosecutor of probation is a more difficult 
question for the Court. I think the Court perceived that at the same time 
that Mr. Archibald did. And the good news with regards, I think, to this 
particular issue is that there was not an answer provided, and I think had 
there been, that would have been more aggravating and more difficult for 
the Court to deny the motion for mistrial. 
I would note that the witness did testify regarding the statement that 
the defendant had made that he had been smoking marijuana since he 
was 15 years old. That evidence came in without any sort of objection, 
and so I think that needs to be stated in the context of this objection, and 
so what the Court intends on doing is giving a limiting instruction to the 
jury again not to consider the previous question. 
And, with that, this Court will deny defense's motion for the mistrial 
on those two grounds. I think it's recognized by the prosecutor that that 
was not an appropriate question and, again, I believe that the jury has 
been introduced to the marijuana issue. It's one of the counts that has 
been charged. The defendant has made some statement, whether you 
call them admissions or not, surrounding that marijuana mitigates the 
prejudice that the jury or that the defendant would experience as a result 
of the jury just hearing the question by the prosecutor. 
(Tr., p.252, L.7 - p.254, L.5.) The district court then struck the question and told the jury 
not to consider it. (Tr., p.254, Ls.16-19.) 
Mr. Frauenberger asserts that the district court abused its discretion by failing to 
recognize that the extraneous information to which the jury was exposed could have 
reasonably resulted in prejudice. Arguments regarding the vouching testimony provided 
by Officer Smith and that such testimony is misconduct can be found above and are 
incorporated by reference. He asserts that a limiting instruction is insufficient and that 
the proper remedy was for the district court to grant a mistrial because of the danger of 
improper influence. 
Further, contrary to the district court's findings, the record reflects that the jury 
heard Officer Smith answer the question affirmatively regarding Mr. Frauenberger's 
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probation. (Tr., p.247, Ls.10-13.) As such, the district court's analysis is flawed. The 
district court acknowledged that if there had been an answer the prejudice would be 
greater. Mr. Frauenberger asserts that the jury hearing information not only that he had 
used marijuana in the past, but had been criminally punished, created a great risk that 
prejudice could have occurred. 
Additionally, Mr. Frauenberger asserts that providing the jury with information 
that he was on probation for possessing marijuana is comparable evaluating the need 
for a bifurcated trial in felony driving under the influence cases. The Idaho Supreme 
Court has held, in determining the need for bifurcated trials for felony driving under the 
influence charges, that "[t]he possibility of prejudice against defendant resulting from 
evidence or knowledge of prior crimes outweighs any policy argument regarding the 
complication of trial proceedings." State v. Wiggins, 96 Idaho 766, 768 (1975). In so 
finding, the Wiggins Court quoted State ex rei. Edelstein v. Huneke, 249 P. 784 
(Wash.1926): "It seems too plain for argument that to place before a jury the charge in 
an indictment, and to offer evidence on trial as a part of the state's case that the 
defendant has previously been convicted of one or more offenses is to run a great risk 
of creating a prejudice in the minds of the jury that no instruction of the court can wholly 
erase." Id. 
The information regarding Officer Smith's opinion of B.H.'s veracity and 
Mr. Frauenberger's past criminal conviction, even with the benefit of a limiting 
instruction, could have reasonably resulted in prejudice to Mr. Frauenberger and, 
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ultimately, deprived him of his right to a fair trial.6 As such, Mr. Frauenberger asserts 
that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. 
Mr. Frauenberger contends that this error was not harmless. Because there was 
a timely objection, Mr. Frauenberger only has the duty to prove that an error occurred, 
"at which point the State has the burden of demonstrating that the error is harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho at 222. The State cannot show 
the error was harmless in this case. 
2. Misconduct For Which There Was No Objection: The Prosecution 
Committed Misconduct By Encroaching Upon The Jury'S Function To 
Make Credibility Determinations, And By Appealing To The Passions And 
Prejudices Of The Jury 
Closing argument "serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the 
trier of fact in a criminal case." State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007) 
(quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975)). Its purpose "is to enlighten 
the jury and to help the jurors remember and interpret the evidence." Id. (quoting 
State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445,450 (Ct. App. 1991)). "Both sides have traditionally 
6 Mr. Frauenberger felt that he must take the stand and discuss the fact that he was on 
probation as a result of the improper questioning, despite the limiting instruction. 
Defense counsel specifically noted that since the probation had been brought up by the 
State that they were now going to address it though Mr. Frauenberger's testimony. 
(Tr., p.290, Ls.17-21.) Defense counsel further explained the perceived need for this 
testimony at the hearing on the Motion for New Trial: 
... when the issue of the probation came up, it - that did, that did put us 
in an impossible position because not the Court - now the jurors had 
heard it. .. I had to talk to my client and his father about it, about - do we 
proceed? Do - does Joey take the stand? Do we address this probation 
issue? How, how do we address that? And, and, and a criminal defendant 
shouldn't have to be in that position, should have to focus his defense on, 
on improper questioning of the prosecuting attorney. And so, and so it 
was, it was just a difficult situation. 
(Tr.6/15/11, p.5, L.21 - p.6, L.8.) 
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been afforded considerable latitude in closing argument to the jury and are entitled to 
discuss fully, from their respective standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be 
drawn therefrom." /d. (quoting State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280 (2003)). 
However, considerable latitude has its limits, both in matters expressly stated and those 
implied. /d. 
a. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct By Encroaching Upon The 
JUry's Function To Make Credibility Determinations 
The prosecutor engaged in impermissible vouching by stating that he believed 
the victim and her story during closing arguments. Prosecutors too often forget that 
they are a part of the machinery of the court, and that they occupy an official position, 
which necessarily leads jurors to give more credence to their statements, action, and 
conduct in the course of the trial and in the presence of the jury than they will give to 
counsel for the accused. State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, _, 71 P. 608, 610 (1903). The 
prosecutor's duty is to see that the defendant has a fair trial by presenting only 
competent evidence and should avoid presenting evidence to prejudice the minds of the 
jury. /d. The prosecutor must refrain from deceiving the jury by use of inappropriate 
inferences. /d. 
In Love/ass, the prosecutor informed the jury in closing argument that Lovelass 
had committed "full-fledged perjury," that Lovelass had lied on more than one occasion, 
and everything he said to the jury was fabricated. State v. Love/ass, 133 Idaho 160, 
169 (Ct. App. 1999). The Love/ass Court stated that in closing argument, "both the 
prosecutor and defense counsel are entitled to discuss fully, from their respective 
standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom," and that this 
includes "the right to identify how, from the party's perspective, the evidence confirms or 
calls into doubt the credibility of particular witnesses." /d. at 168, 983 P.2d at 241 
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(citation omitted). However, "it is improper for a prosecutor to express a personal belief 
or opinion regarding the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or as to the guilt of 
the defendant." Id. (citation omitted). The Court of Appeals held that the comments did 
not constitute fundamental error as they appeared to have fallen within the broad range 
of fair comment on the evidence rather than an expression of the prosecutor's personal 
belief, but also recognized that the prosecutor's comments were troubling and less than 
artful. Id. at 169. In State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496 (1999), even though the Idaho 
Supreme Court held that the prosecutor's statement that Hairston was a "murdering 
dog" did not constitute fundamental error, the statement was criticized as "clearly 
improper." Id. at 507, 988 P.2d at 1181. The Idaho Supreme Court cautioned that, 
"[t]rial attorneys must avoid improper argument if the system is to work properly. If 
attorneys do not recognize improper argument and persist in its use, they should not be 
members of The ... Sar." Id. at 508 (citing Luce v. State, 642 SO.2d 4 (Fla. Ct. App. 
1994)). 
Here, the prosecutor's complained of comments during closing argument were 
not directed toward the evidence, or inferences drawn therefrom. Instead, the 
prosecutor expressed his opinion and belief that the alleged victim, S.H., was a credible 
and truthful witness. The prosecution's statements went much further than the 
permissible bounds allowed to encourage a jury to question the credibility of witnesses. 
The prosecutor committed misconduct when he stated the following: "[S.H.] told you 
about these behaviors, and she was honest with you. It's the state's position that 
she has no impetus to lie, if she's willing to tell you what a tough kid she was." 
(Tr.4/28/11 , p.187, LS.10-13 (emphasis added).) This comment was a direct statement 
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that the prosecutor, and all the official powers behind her position, believed that S.H. 
was telling the truth, and is prosecutorial misconduct. 
It is a violation of Mr. Frauenberger's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial to 
have a jury reach its decision on any factor other than the evidence admitted at trial and 
the law as explained in the jury instructions. In this case, misconduct related to 
prosecutorial vouching interfered with the jury's ability to make an impartial decision, 
thereby interfering with Mr. Frauenberger's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. 
As such, the misconduct in this case clearly violates Mr. Frauenberger's unwaived 
constitutional rights and deprived him of his right to a fair trial. As such, this Court must 
vacate the conviction. 
b. The Prosecution Committed Misconduct Sy Appealing To The 
Passions And Prejudices Of The Jury 
During closing arguments, the prosecutor made the following statements: 
[S.H.] was pretty vulnerable to someone who wanted to get his own way 
with her. She didn't have anybody really looking out for her .... The 
defendant, was in a really good position to be able to prey on someone 
who was wondering away from the herd, a really good position. Secause 
let's look at it. How does a wolf decide on its prey? It looks for someone 
who is weak. They could be old, could be sick, could be really young and 
not have the physical strength to resist it. Looks for someone who's 
wandering away from the herd, ignoring the safety in numbers that comes 
with that, sneaking out, looking for greener grass someplace else or 
maybe entertainment or diversion if you're a 13-year-old girl without 
anybody watching out for you. Someone who's unaware of the danger 
and unaware of what can happen with you sneak out in the middle of the 
night with some boy, looking for maybe somebody who doesn't care about 
the danger. So those conditions make that particular prey an easy target. 
Here the prey was [S.H.]. What made here an easy target? Well, as I 
said, most of the evidence that was heard from her, she was 13 years old 
in the 8th grade. Talked about the family situation .... She didn't have any 
guidance of an adult. And her testimony here, as you maybe saw, it 
wasn't easy for her ... She was so nervous that she peeled the skin off 
her little finger while she was testifying Tuesday. 
(TrAI28/11, p.187, L.14 - p.189, L.8.) 
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· .. find the defendant guilty, because he is a predator. He preyed on 
someone who was vulnerable and weak, and don't let that happen here in 
our city, because [B.H.] doesn't have anything except the law that says 
people under 16 don't have the capacity to consent. That's what she has 
to protect her. 
(TrA/28/11, p.198, Ls.13-18.) 
The prosecutor's statements amounted to an improper plea for the jury to decide 
this case based upon its fears, passions, and prejudices. In United States v. 
Weatherspoon, 410 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit held that such pleas are 
wholly improper: 
A prosecutor may not urge jurors to convict a criminal defendant in order 
to protect community values, preserve civil order, or deter future 
lawbreaking. The evil lurking in such prosecutorial appeals is that the 
defendant will be convicted for reasons wholly irrelevant to his own guilt or 
innocence. Jurors may be persuaded by such appeals to believe that, 
convicting a defendant, they will assist in the solution of some pressing 
social problem. The amelioration of society's woes is far too heavy a 
burden for the individual criminal defendant to bear. 
Id. at 1149 (quoting United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting 
United States v. Monaghan, 741 F.2d 1434,41 (D.C. Cir. 1984))). In Weatherspoon, 
where the defendant was charged with being a convicted felon in possession of a 
firearm, portions of the prosecutor's closing argument focused on the personal comfort 
and community safety which is attendant to taking armed ex-cons off the streets. Id. at 
1149. The Ninth Circuit held that, "[t]hat entire line of argument ... was improper." Id. 
Then, after quoting the above language from Koon and Monaghan, it observed that 
since Mr. Weatherspoon's case turned solely on the question of whether he had, in fact, 
been in possession of a firearm on the night in question, the prosecutor's arguments 
about the "potential social ramifications of the jury's reaching a guilty verdict," were 
"irrelevant and improper" because "[t]hey were clearly designed to encourage the jury to 
enter a verdict on the basis of emotion rather than fact." Id. at 1149-50. See also 
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v. Payne, 260 Conn. 446, 462-463 (2002) (finding prosecutorial misconduct where the 
prosecutor made a closing argument statement that was "a direct and unabashed 
appeal for the jury to find the defendant guilty out of sympathy for the victim and his 
family"). 
Because the prosecutor's statements in this case, much like the prosecutor's 
pleas in Weatherspoon and Payne, were calculated to encourage the jury to reach a 
guilty verdict based on its emotion and sympathy for B.H., rather than the facts of the 
case, they were irrelevant and improper and their admission violated 
Mr. Frauenberger's rights to a fair trial and due process under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. As such, this Court must vacate the conviction. 
c. The Prosecutorial Misconduct Related To Encroaching Upon The 
Jury's Function To Make Credibility Determinations And Appealing 
To The Passions And Prejudices Of The Jury Is Reviewable As 
Fundamental Error 
First, it is a violation of Mr. Frauenberger's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair 
trial to have a jury reach its decision on any factor other than the evidence admitted at 
trial and the law as explained in the jury instructions. As such, prosecutorial 
misconduct, in general, directly violates a constitutional right. It should be noted that the 
Idaho Supreme Court stated in Perry that, "Where a prosecutor attempts to secure a 
verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the 
evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from 
that evidence, this impacts a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair tria!." 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. This is an implicit recognition by the Idaho Supreme Court that 
prosecutorial misconduct claims are connected to a constitutional provision. 
In this case, the misconduct also interfered with the jury's ability to make an 
impartial decision by personally vouching for a witness' credibility and clouding the 
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issues with appeals to the passions and prejudices of the jury, thereby interfering with 
Mr. Frauenberger's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. The State violated 
Mr. Frauenberger's right to a jury trial when the prosecutor attempted to encroach upon 
the jury's vital and exclusive function to weigh the evidence or lack of evidence 
presented. ''The right to a jury trial contained in the Sixth Amendment ... includes the 
right to have the jury be 'the sole judge of the weight of the testimony.'" State v. Elmore, 
154 Wash. App. 885, 228 P.3d 760 (WA 2010) (quoting State v. Lane, 125 Wash.2d 
825, 838, 889 P.2d 929 (WA 1995) (quoting State v. Crotts, 22 Wash. 245, 250-51, 60 
P. 403 (1900)). 
The misconduct in this case not only involved Mr. Frauenberger's state and 
federal constitutional rights to due process, but also his federal and state constitutional 
rights to a jury trial. As such, the error is reviewable for fundamental error. The error in 
this case plainly exists from the record and no additional information is necessary. 
Further, it cannot be a tactical decision on the part of the defense to have a jury reach a 
verdict, not based on the evidence and law, but based on impermissible grounds 
presented through misconduct. 
The prosecutorial misconduct requires vacation of the conviction. In the case at 
hand, this Court should find that the misconduct denied Mr. Frauenberger his right to a 
fair trial because it cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that misconduct did not 
contribute to the verdict. The case was not clear cut and was based solely upon the 
jury's credibility determination of both S.H. and Mr. Frauenberger, as they were the only 
individuals who may have witnessed or engaged in any inappropriate conduct because 
no other witness was able to testify to observing anything more than seeing the two in 
each others presence. Additionally, there was no physical evidence provided either of 
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the alleged sexual contact or the existence or use of marijuana. In reviewing the trial as 
a whole, the prosecutor's improper comments, constituting misconduct, may have 
influenced the jury in this case. As such, this Court must vacate the conviction. 
3. Even If The Above Errors Are Harmless, The Accumulation Of The 
Prosecutorial Misconduct Amounts To Cumulative Error 
Mr. Frauenberger asserts that if the Court finds that the above prosecutorial 
misconduct was harmless, the errors combined amount to cumulative error. "Under the 
doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in and of themselves, may in 
the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. However, a necessary predicate to the 
application of the doctrine is a finding of more than one error." Perry, 150 Idaho at 230. 
Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that when ruling on a motion for mistrial 
brought after an instance of alleged prosecutorial misconduct, the district court should 
not limit its view of the misconduct to the specific isolated incident, but should also take 
into consideration whether or not the prosecutor is engaging in a pattern of misbehavior. 
State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, _, 253 P.3d 727, 744-45 (2011). 
Mr. Frauenberger asserts that given the multiple instances of prosecutorial 
misconduct, it is likely that even if each of the instances individually did not amount to 
reversible error, the accumulation of the misconduct including the presentation of 
vouching testimony, providing the jury with improper information, and appealing to the 
passions and prejudices of the jury, influenced the jury and deprived Mr. Frauenberger 
of his right to a fair trial. 
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v. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed, Upon Mr. Frauenberger, 
Unified Sentences Of Ten Years, With Two Years Fixed, For The Lewd Conduct 
Charges, And Four Years, With One Year Fixed, For The Delivery Of Marijuana Charge, 
To Be Served Concurrently 
Mr. Frauenberger asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentences 
of ten years, with two years fixed, for the lewd conduct charges, and four years, with 
one year fixed, for the delivery of marijuana charge, to be served concurrently, are 
excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an 
excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of 
the record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense the character of the 
offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 
(Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '''[w]here a sentence is within statutory 
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of 
the court imposing the sentence.'" State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) 
(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979». Mr. Frauenberger does not allege 
that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an 
abuse of discretion, Mr. Frauenberger must show that in light of the governing criteria, 
the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing State v. 
Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141,145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 
121 Idaho 385 (1992». The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are: 
(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the 
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting 
State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. 
Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138 (2001». 
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Mr. Frauenberger asserts that the district court failed to properly consider the 
mitigating factors that exist in his case. Specifically, he asserts that the district court 
failed to give proper consideration to his young age and desire to become a successful, 
contributing member of society as an adult. Mr. Frauenberger was only eighteen years 
old when the instant offenses occurred. (PSI, pp.1-2.) The Idaho Supreme Court has 
recognized a point first made by Justice Bistline in his dissent in State v. Adams, 99 
Idaho 75 (1978), that in modifying sentences, the Court "has given great weight to the 
age of a defendant." Broadhead, 120 Idaho at 144 (citations omitted). Further, 
Mr. Frauenberger has completed his GED and attended a semester of college at the 
College of Southern Idaho. (PSI, p.7.) He has noted that he has goals for a better 
future including "to be successful, have a good job, have an amazing family, [and] own 
my own business." (PSI, p.11.) Mr. Frauenberger's young age and desire to have a 
successful future counsels toward a less sever sentence. 
Furthermore, Mr. Frauenberger has family support. In State v. Shideler, 103 
Idaho 593, 594 (1982), the Idaho Supreme Court noted that family and friend support 
were factors that should be considered in the Court's decision as to what is an 
appropriate sentence. Id. At the sentencing hearing, Mr. Frauenberger's father, noted 
that he had done all he could to support his son, would be available as a source of help 
to him if he were released, loved his son, and only wants the best for him. (Tr., p.399, 
Ls.3-12.) 
Prior to these offenses, Mr. Frauenberger has never been convicted of a felony. 
(PSI, pp.3-5.) The Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that the first offender should 
be accorded more lenient treatment than the habitual crimina!." State v. Hoskins, 131 
Idaho 670, 673 (1998) (quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled on 
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other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227 (1971)); see also State v. Nice, 103 
Idaho 89, 91 (1982). The defendant in Hoskins pled guilty to two counts of drawing a 
check without funds. Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 673. In Nice, the defendant pled guilty to 
the charge of lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor. Nice, 103 Idaho at 90. In both 
Hoskins and Nice, the court considered, among other important factors, that the 
defendants had no prior felony convictions. Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 673; Nice, 103 Idaho 
at 90. The Hoskins Court ultimately found that based upon the nature of the offense 
and the absence of any prior serious criminal record, the district court abused its 
discretion in imposing the sentence. Hoskins, 131 Idaho at 675. 
Although Mr. Frauenberger does have a history of juvenile and misdemeanor 
convictions, the felony charges in this case are his only felony convictions. This fact 
counsels toward a less sever punishment. 
Idaho courts have previously recognized that substance abuse and a desire for 
treatment should be considered as a mitigating factor by the district court when that 
court imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982), see also State v. Alberts, 
121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991). Mr. Frauenberger has admitted to prior occasional 
alcohol use and prior marijuana use. (PSI, p.1 0.) At times, his marijuana use has been 
as often as daily use. (PSI, p.10.) It was recommended that Mr. Frauenberger 
participate in Level I Outpatient Treatment to address his substance abuse issues. 
(PSI, p.11.) 
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Frauenberger asserts that the 
district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him. He 
asserts that had the district court properly considered his young age, family support, 
status as a first time felony offender, and substance abuse coupled with a need for 
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treatment, it would have crafted a sentence that focused on his rehabilitation and future 
potential in the community, rather than incarceration. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Frauenberger respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions and 
remand his case for further proceedings. Alternatively, he requests that this Court 
reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate. 
DATED this 4th day of May, 2012. 
(//~ /) / 
~~~ ...... L e/C~/ / 
ELIZABETH ANN ALLRED 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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